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3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Conversation, shouts, and laughter filled the atmosphere of the non-profit in 
downtown Haifa as I sat in the side office to hear Karim’s thoughts. 1, 2 As with 
almost every conversation I had the privilege of sharing with religious and ethnic 
minorities in Turkey and Israel, I was confronted with harsh, shocking realities. 
Karim is a masterful storyteller, and relayed his Palestinian family’s tumultuous 
history in the State of Israel with many smiles and creative flair, yet serious sobriety. 
His tone took a dark shift as he said: 
This is true in Israel. Everyone is your enemy unless he is of ‘your kind.’ It’s a 
sick, racist mentality. You can’t call it anything different than that. The more 
that you live in Israel, the more you understand the truth is not nice. It is 
what it is…it could be nice for some. And Israel is a racist, sick country. And 
our mentalities…we are raised like that.3 
 
Stories like this surfaced in a myriad of ways among Kurds, Greeks, and Armenians 
in Turkey and Arabs in Israel. This theme of nationalistic fervor, fear, and 
boundaries colored our conversations, and sometimes left me feeling despondent in 
light of the stark barriers that are erected between people: be they religious, ethnic, 
or nationality, that serve to stifle those who don’t fit the prevailing definitions of 
power, safety, and being. Yet, in the midst of these interviews, something beautifully 
and remarkably human began to glimmer. 
 In this paper, I will argue that the historical roots and current manifestations 
of secular and religious nationalism in the Republic of Turkey and the State of Israel 
                                                        
1 I chose not to name the non-profit in order to maintain the privacy of individuals.  
2 All the names used in this paper are pseudonyms, unless referencing public 
figures. While choosing pseudonyms, I made sure that the names reflected the 
culture of individuals in using Arab, Armenian, and Kurdish names. 
3 Ethnographic Interview 2016. 
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are well understood in light of Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of totality. Furthermore, 
as discovered through ethnographic research I collected concerning the lived 
experiences of ethnic and religious minorities in these nations, I will posit that the 
best response to these all-encompassing, exclusive worldviews is found in the 
reality of the human face, as conceptualized by Levinas in connection with his 
notion of infinity. I will support this claim in seven steps. 
In the first section, I will explore the roots and development of modern 
Turkish nationalism, focusing on its ties to a fragmented imperial past. Second, I will 
elucidate the long, scarred history of the Jewish people and their path to embracing 
Zionism, and how this ideology manifests itself today in the Jewish State. Third, I 
will offer an introduction to Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy of totality and infinity, 
which will color the analysis of my ethnographic fieldwork. Fourth, my ethnographic 
methodology will be shared in order to further sharpen the context given to the final 
two sections. Fifth, I will analyze my fieldwork in light of Levinas’ notion of totality, 
in which I will work to show that the prevailing nationalistic assumptions in both 
contexts are well conceptualized with the language he utilizes. Sixth, my interviews 
will be further explored with Levinas’ concept of infinity, which is localized in the 
human face, and begin to offer a solution to the nationalistic totalities that so 
dominate both locales. Finally, I will endeavor to tie these sections together and 
offer concluding thoughts concerning my ethnographic data and our world that is so 
characterized by totalistic boundaries, and the potential Levinas’ philosophy 
possesses to articulate and address such pervasive boundaries. 
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Section 1. 
Turkish Nationalism: Vatan and a Fragmented Imperial Past 
Perhaps the most important word in the Turkish language concerning the 
unity and cohesion of Turkish society is “vatan.” It has Arabic roots that signify the 
place of one’s birth, and can be translated into English as “homeland.” However, this 
direct translation is extremely lacking, as it, “refers not only to the national territory 
but also to major political and legal concepts…including citizen (vatandaş), 
patriotism (vatanseverlik), heimatlos (vatansız), high treason (vatana ihanet), and 
traitor to homeland (vatan haini).”4 It is a far-reaching, multi-faceted word that has 
carried many different meanings in the last few centuries. In this section, I will argue 
that modern Turkish nationalism (both secular and religious strains) rose from the 
ashes of a fragmented imperial past, and has resulted in the creation of a state that is 
incredibly patriotic, passionate, and, in some cases, xenophobic and violent in its 
protection of the “pure,” albeit constructed vatan that belongs to the Turkish Nation.  
 While vatan is now central in Turkish thought, the oldest Ottoman ideas 
viewed the world through the lens of the “ummah,” that is, the people of the Islamic 
faith.5 This primarily theological understanding of life, community, and the empire 
was all encompassing. In fact, Islamic jurists defined the world in two pieces, one 
called the Abode of Islam and the other the Place of War.6 The Abode of Islam is 
fairly easy to grasp, as it is defined as any place where the Islamic faith and law 
prevail. The Abode of War refers to a place where Islamic jurisprudence and 
                                                        
4 Behlül Özkan, From the Abode of Islam to the Turkish Vatan (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2012), 2.  
5 Ibid., 13. 
6 Ibid., 13-14. 
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practice doesn’t reign as “war,” a word that can be problematic to understand 
historically, especially concerning modern conceptions of the Islamic faith as 
inherently violent. However, Özkan likens it to the Cold war bloc, where armies 
were always maintained in case of conflict, but vital trade and interactions continue 
in the absence of confrontation. In fact, instead of accepting the relations between 
the Abode of Islam and the rest as an incessant warfare, Ottomans acknowledged 
the existence of an alternative political and religious order on the other side of the 
frontier.7 In short, for most of its existence, the Ottoman Empire was primarily an 
empire ruled by a Sultan who sat in the throne by divine right, and the concept of a 
“nation-state” was non-existent.  
However, the French Revolution and its “vocabulary of liberty, equality, and 
fraternity” changed the social landscape of Europe and much of the world after the 
end of the 18th century.8 The Ottoman Empire was no exception. The French word 
“patrie,” created to indicate the loyalty, value, and total love for homeland was 
translated to “vatan” in Turkish, and the idea of love for country and nationality was 
born. In 1839, Sultan Mahmud II died, and the Tanzimat (The Reforms) period 
began.9 This was a time full of crises for the Imperial Power, such as the Egyptian 
conflict (1839-1841), Crimean War (1854-1856), and Russo-Turkish War (1877-
1878).10 The empire’s power was beginning to dwindle, and in this season of 
uncertainty, Ottoman patriotism was born. Namık Kemal, who is known in Turkey 
                                                        
7 Ibid., 14 
8 Ibid., 27.  
9 Carter Vaughn Findley. Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010), 77. 
10 Ibid., 76.  
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as the “‘poet of the vatan’...transformed the meaning from a feeling of belonging to a 
birthplace into a feeling of loyalty toward a sacred territory.”11 He was one of the 
key thinkers of the Young Ottomans, a patriotic movement that sought to unite all 
constituents of the Ottoman Empire under the Imperial Vatan, either through the 
“Unity of the Elements” (focused on all ethnic religious groups) or ‘Unity of Islam,” 
which were used interchangeably. Although prevailing patriotic rhetoric and 
thought were localized around the empire, this period also saw the intellectual Ali 
Suavi first explore the “concept of Turkishness.” He is now considered by some to be 
the first Turkish nationalist.12 This slight, yet important shift ought not be missed—
the vatan was first beginning to move from the concept of empire to ethnicity. 
In 1889, the Ottoman Unity Society was born (renamed the Committee of 
Union and Progress [CUP] in 1895) during a time of renewed Imperial power under 
Sultan Abdülhamid. It was a collection of leading intellectuals who possessed 
differing ideologies but shared a common enemy in the reigning autocratic sultan. 
After Armenian rebellions and further conflict in Anatolian provinces between 1894 
and 1896, the CUP published Vatan Tehlikede (Vatan is in Danger), in which the 
“Armenian question” was that “which put state, nation, and 600 year old honor in 
danger,” and subsequently called for “all Ottomans,” to act to “save their vatan” by 
demanding the sultan reinstate the Parliament, which would promote equality 
between Muslims and Christians.13 In the mind of the CUP, this reintroduction of 
Parliamentary governance would help unify the diverse groups of the empire. 
                                                        
11 Özkan, Abode of Islam, 39.  
12 Ibid., 42.  
13 Ibid., 46-47.  
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However, this seemingly democratic, egalitarian stance covered a sinister 
ideology. Therefore, a few words about the history of minorities (especially 
Armenians), in Turkey/the Ottoman Empire are warranted. Up until the dissolution 
of the empire in 1923, the millet system was the primary way the ruling elites 
related to minority communities. These “millets” reported to the empire, but were 
granted much autonomy under their own religious leaders and eventually became 
understood as religious, ethnic, and linguistic communities.14 Imbalances between 
Christians and Muslims began with the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 
1838, which “allowed foreign merchants to participate in internal trade.”15 This 
system benefitted Christian merchants in the Empire, for Europeans generally chose 
to do business with them, resulting in the elimination of Muslim merchants. This 
disparity further solidified and “increased national awareness and exacerbated 
religious and ethnic tensions with grave consequences in the future.”16, 17 
The phrase pioneered in Vatan Tehlikede, “save the vatan,” became one of the 
central ideas of the Young Turks, the group that overthrew the sultanate in 1908 
and reinstated the constitution that had been removed by Sultan Abdülhamid in 
1876. Tensions between Ottoman Muslims and Armenians continued to boil 
throughout the rise of the Young Turks and, as a result, some members introduced 
the idea of the systematic “ethnoreligious homogenization” and “population and 
resettlement policy” of the Armenians (and other minorities), in the name of 
                                                        
14 Samim Akgönül. Muslim Minorities , Volume 13: Minority Concept in the Turkish 
Context: Practices and Perceptions in Turkey, Greece, and France (Brill, 2013), 69.  
15 Özkan, Abode of Islam, 35.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Feroz  Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (New York: Routledge, 1996), 28. 
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reinstating a “Turkish” identity and purifying the vatan. Taner Akçam writes, 
“During the First World War the Ottoman authorities, having sustained a punishing 
sequence of military defeats, came to fear the imminent loss of the empire’s entire 
territory, with the horrendous possibility that the reform agreement of February 
1914 would be implemented. “18 That agreement, made between the Ottoman 
Empire and Russia before the war, had established the Armenian right to 
“participate on an equal basis in the local administration” in eastern Turkey. It was 
an agreement that, upon signing, all parties involved, “knew…(would be) the 
beginning of an independent Armenian state.”19  
Then, after the disastrous defeat of Ottoman forces at the hands of Russia at 
Sarıkamış (1915) in World War I, “the Ottomans increasingly saw themselves beset 
by dangers from all sides,” which led to a sinister rise of propaganda falsely blaming 
Armenian revolts, treachery, and betrayal for their increasing failures.20 This, among 
other allegations and coupled with the historical plans of the “homogenization” of 
the land resulted in the internal displacement, expulsion, or annihilation of one third 
of Anatolia’s 17.5 million people (largely Armenians) between 1913 and 1918.21 
This violence created an Armenian diaspora and left deep scars on the psyche of this 
important minority community. Furthermore, these themes of Armenian treachery 
and deception carry on today in media, politics, and even education. 
                                                        
18 Taner Akçam. Young Turks’ Crimes Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and 
Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2014), xvii. 
19 Ibid., xviii.  
20 Ibid., 158-159. 
21 Ibid., 29-30. 
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Undergirded by works like “Three Political Ways” by Yusuf Akçura 
(published in 1904), which has been called the “Manifesto of Turkish Nationalism,” 
and which trumpeted Turkism as the best, yet nascent, political alternative to 
Ottomanism and Islamism, people began to look to “nationalist ideologies, which 
aimed to create national territories, (which) were much more powerful than 
imperial patriotism in creating physical boundaries, to unite and divide space and 
mental boundaries and to separate ‘us’ from ‘them.’”22 In the late 1910s after the 
Empire’s defeat in World War I, Mustafa Kemal and the national liberation 
movement he spearheaded mixed concepts like “Ottoman vatan” with “national 
borders,” and created a “national Ottoman unity that was geographically limited to 
Anatolia and did not have any imperial ambitions.”23 
 Until 1921, Kemal, hereafter called Atatürk, preferred to use more inclusive 
phrases like “people in Turkey” when giving public addresses. However, his rhetoric 
narrowed at that time, with him moving towards ethnic nationalism and making the 
claim, “Turkey belongs to the Turks,” in August 1921.24 Furthermore, “no place” was 
found for Christian groups, namely Armenians and Greeks, in this understanding of 
Turkish identity.25 In 1923, the Republic of Turkey was founded, and a nationalistic, 
secular Kemalist ideology took hold of this young nation steered by their 
charismatic leader, whose visage is still ubiquitous in Turkish public places, 
signature is plastered on cars and in human flesh, and name is illegal to copy or 
blaspheme.   
                                                        
22 Özkan, Abode of Islam, 51, 57. 
23 Ibid., 90.  
24 Ibid., 94-95.  
25 Ibid., 90.   
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Today, Turkish nationalism colors the collective mindset of the Republic. In 
2008, the headlines in Turkey told a unique story. Twenty high school students from 
central Turkey had painted a Turkish flag (all red with a white sickle moon and star 
in the center) with their own blood, and presented it to Turkey’s top military chief, 
General Yaşar Büyükanıt, to commemorate the deaths of twelve soldiers killed two 
months previously in clashes with Kurdish separatist PKK fighters. They also 
presented a petition to “please take us immediately as soldiers.” He then responded, 
“This is the kind of nation we are. We are a great nation. Truly our martyrs have 
died for a holy purpose. That holy purpose is to protect the country we live in as one 
and undivided.”26  
Modern Turkey is characterized by “emphasis on blood, purity, boundaries, 
and honor…the link between being Turkish and being Muslim; a substratum of 
militarism, hostility, suspicion, and authoritarianism; and a heightened discourse of 
fear and polarization of society.” This polarization is brought on by the rise of new 
“heterodox forms of nationalism” that privilege Muslim identity over the Kemalist 
concepts of race and blood as national solidarity.27 These disagreements, although 
important and central in political discourse, still assume Turkish identity as 
preeminent. Furthermore, Akçam holds that the “roots of the problems with which 
Turkey grapples today stretch back to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey 
in the early 1920s…(which) derive from its Ottoman inheritance.28 Therefore, 
Turkey is haunted by its lost imperial past as well as grappling with what it means 
                                                        
26 Jenny White. Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 1.  
27 Ibid., 3.  
28 Akçam, From Empire to Republic, 11.  
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to be “Turkish” in light of it, thereby creating a society that presents nuanced, 
complex problems for its historically ancient minority communities. 
 These problems and ideologies that intersect and compete with each other 
combine to create an environment of deep suspicion and fear. Some Turks fear that 
foreign anthropologists are seeking to undermine “Turkishness” through Turkey’s 
“Armenian, Christian, and other minorities (like the Kurds) and through 
missionaries…” a fear that is combatted by manipulating “anthropology, history, and 
linguistics” to create a national identity. For example, one man at an anthropological 
conference claimed that (due to “similarities” in shared words) the ancient 
Sumerian language is actually Turkish, no other people groups have lived in 
Anatolia besides Turks, and the famous Byzantine cathedral of Hagia Sophia 
contained no Greek writing, only Turkish.29  
The military is also caught up in the ideology that “defines Turkey as a 
singular, unitary nation that is under continual threat from within and without.” 30 
In short, very few can be trusted, both inside and outside the Republic’s borders. 
One Turkish officer who desired to explain nationalism mused, “A real nationalist 
believes that Turkey should be completely independent…Turks are a special 
people…There has always been Turkishness, from the beginning of history.”31 In his 
mind, education is the key to the fullest realization of this truth. Historically, Turkish 
education at every level has embraced this very belief, with, for instance, geography 
textbooks that refuse to acknowledge the existence of Kurds in Turkey, spin 
                                                        
29 White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, 57. 
30 Ibid., 59. 
31 Ibid., 60.  
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narratives to laud Turkey as central in world politics and placement (surrounded by 
enemies) which justifies a strong military, and with one textbook making the 
spurious claim that 99% of Turkey’s population is Turkish Muslim.32 The same 
officer quoted above finished his exposition of nationalism with this statement, 
“Turkishness is enough.”33 This mentality of a single-minded identity as superior 
and sufficient colors military, politics, religion, and education, and permeates the 
sentiment of many individuals in the Turkish vatan.  
Despite all these prejudices and fears, Turks exhibit a kind of nostalgia for an 
idealized past where multiculturalism flourished and people of differing faiths lived 
peacefully side-by-side. Still, “as demonstrated in polls and in people’s choices of 
lifestyle—many Turks appear to desire distance in their daily lives from those who 
are different.”34 Furthermore, despite the reality that, as put forth by an Armenian 
Priest I interviewed, “If we sit next to each other, you will not (be able to tell) who is 
Greek, who is Armenian, who is Jewish, (and) who is Turkish, for we all are 
belonging to Anatolia,”35 in 2008 an opposition politician announced that President 
Gül’s mother was Armenian and he therefore, because of his “ethnic origins,” is 
unable to “represent all Turks equally.” He responded with a public statement 
defending both parents’ lines as “Muslim” and “Turk,” and filed a lawsuit against the 
politician, all the while praising Turkey’s diversity and equality among its citizens.36 
This example, among the others discussed, reveals that difference is, as a whole, 
                                                        
32 Özkan, Abode of Islam,141-143. 
33 White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, 60.  
34 Ibid., 113.  
35 Ethnographic Interview Istanbul 2015. 
36 White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks, 91. 
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mistrusted, feared, and even shunned in the name of pure blood and the national 
Vatan. A vatan that has become a singular entity bequeathed to and owned by a 
poorly-defined, incredibly ambiguous, yet viciously defended construct of 
“Turkishness” that drives the national conscience of this (once-imperial) rapidly 
polarizing state. 
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Section 2. 
Zionism: Suffering, Safety, and Eretz Yisrael  
The late 19th century saw a rise in anti-Semitic rhetoric and action 
throughout Western Europe and Russia. Pogroms characterized the cold landscape 
of the land of the Tsar, and writings began to implicate and blame Jews in the 
climate of “economic uncertainty and social dislocation” that reigned in France.37 
One of the prevailing ideas among educated, socially affluent Jews was that of 
assimilation, which held that, with time and interaction, European nations would 
eventually embrace the Jewish minorities that lived within their borders.  
One such Jew was a young man named Theodor Herzl, a well-known 
journalist and aspiring playwright who, “was typical of the successful and well-
educated Jews of Western Europe, oriented toward, and highly integrated into, the 
society and culture of the Christian majority.”38 Yet, all was not well in his world. His 
faith in the possibility of assimilation fragmented slowly during his time reporting in 
Paris, and the Dreyfus trial in 1894 (in which a Jewish military captain was falsely 
convicted of treason, then proved innocent twelve years later) broke his already 
eroding hope. A few short days later he published The Jewish State, which became 
perhaps the most important work of the burgeoning Zionist movement. In it, he 
spoke on what he called the “Jewish Question,” which he, “consider(ed)…neither a 
social or religious one (question)…(rather) a national question…” That is, the 
survival of the Jewish people, for Herzl, became located in the necessity for an 
                                                        
37 Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2009), 43-44.  
38 Ibid., 44. 
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autonomous Jewish State, one that could last as a place of refuge for Jews and “reach 
powerfully and beneficially for the good of humanity.”39  
That dream has now become a reality. The Jewish people have their place of 
“refuge” and a land to call home. However, as Steven Erlanger has put it, “Zionism 
was never the gentlest of ideologies,” and the reverberations of that reality lives on 
in the entrenched, conflicted state of today: one that is plagued with questions of 
identity, democracy, race, and nation.40 
Mark Tessler writes, “It is inadequate to describe the Jews as a religious 
group in the modern-day sense of the term. Like Muslims, they are more 
appropriately regarded as a national community of believers.” That is, Jews are 
something far more than a religion. They are more than a race. Their “sense of 
peoplehood” is extremely well developed, inextricably bound up in their collective 
historical experience…”41 They tie their roots to the land of Israel spanning back to 
the 13th century BCE with their conquering of the Canaanites, and were definitively 
scattered from it in the 1st and 2nd century CE after the Roman Empire’s crushing 
responses to Jewish revolts in 70 and 135 CE created the Jewish diaspora. The 
history of the diaspora is long and nuanced, and for the sake of space I will reference 
David Vital’s words concerning it: “the seemingly acceptable, ‘non-Exhilic’ exiles—
such as that of Moorish and even Christian Spain where for long periods the Jews 
were a virtually integral part of civil society—all ended too in calamity and fresh 
                                                        
39 Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State. Jewish Virtual Library, 1896 trans. from German 
by Sylvie D’Avigdor, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2.html. 
40 Steve Erlanger, “Who Are the True Heirs of Zionism?” The New York Times. Feb. 4, 
2016.  
41 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 7.  
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dispersion.” In short, their memory is one of “a cyclical granting and withdrawal of 
the gifts of territory and sovereignty, and of concomitant lament and 
thanksgiving.”42  
Hope granted and hope crushed became the norm, and this collective 
suffering brewed messianic hope that resulted in a few movements to Eretz Yisrael 
(The Land of Israel) in the 17th and 18th centuries (mainly by “pious” mystic 
practitioners).  Furthermore, an over-arching, more routinized hope could be seen 
in the Passover Seder recited by each Jew once a year which culminated with the 
words, “next year in Jerusalem,” a kind of prayer, a longing, for a home in the midst 
of exile.43 It is no surprise, then, with the rise secular nationalisms in Europe in the 
19th century, intellectual and spiritual leaders, “saw a need for Jewish self-
determination,” that mirrored these ideological movements.44 This hope, in light of 
the climate of rising anti-Semitism in the mid-to-late 1800s, caused many leading 
Jewish influencers to abandon hope of assimilation and look to an alternative 
answer: that of Eretz Yisrael. 
Theodor Herzl and Ahad Ha’am, the former the father of “political Zionism” 
and the latter of “cultural Zionism,” contributed (although often in disagreement 
with each other) to the belief that the Jewish people needed a homeland. As 
indicated by the name “cultural” Zionism, Ha’am believed that, “the heart of the 
people—that is the foundation on which the land will be regenerated. And the 
people is broken into fragments,” meaning that, before the political state could be 
                                                        
42 David Vital, The Origins of Zionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 5.  
43 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 18-19.  
44 Ibid., 37.  
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established, the Jewish people must be re-made.45 The culture needed a reformation 
before the land could be embraced. Herzl, however, embraced a different strain. He 
believed in a modern, almost secular society, saying, “We shall not revert to a lower 
stage but rise to a higher one. We shall not dwell in mud huts; we shall build new, 
more beautiful and more modern houses, and possess them in safety.”46 
Herzl’s ideology and tireless advocacy eventually won out, and the years 
between the late 19th century and 1948 were characterized by activity. Thousands 
of Jewish immigrants moved to Palestine, concentrated in movements called Aliya 
which were motivated by Zionistic beliefs and escape from persecution. The Modern 
Hebrew language was pioneered by Eliezer Ben Yehuda and became the lingua 
franca of the immigrants in the Yishuv (settlements), despite fierce opposition from 
conservative rabbis who held that the Hebrew language was holy, and therefore 
should be limited to religious use.47 Disagreement emerged among leaders of the 
Zionist movement concerning Palestine’s indigenous Arab population, some already 
in the Yishuv advocating for integration, mutual learning, and collaboration, and 
others (generally still in Europe) viewing the Arab question as secondary or even 
holding separation from or removal of them as the best option.48 Finally, the horrors 
of the Holocaust generated an international outcry to, in some way, aid a people 
who had been decimated by breathtaking systemic violence.  
                                                        
45 Ahad Ha’am, The Wrong Way. Jewish Virtual Library, 1889 trans. from Hebrew in 
1912 by Leon Simon, 
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/wrongway.html. 
46 Walter Laquer, A History of Zionism (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), 86, 
quoted in Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 46.  
47 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 67.  
48 Ibid., 135-137. 
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All of these events led to 1948, a year still lauded as “liberation” and 
“independence” by the majority of the Jewish population, and chillingly labeled “al-
Nakba” (the Catastrophe) by the indigenous Arab population and, by extension, the 
Arab world. The Arabs had rejected two UN partition plans set forth leading up to 
the release of the British Mandate to the Jews on May 15, 1948, and when the day 
came, the Arab-Israeli War (which truly had begun in 1947 with the release of the 
Partition Plan) between the newly created State of Israel and multiple Arab states 
ensued. Numbers vary, but at the cessation of fighting in mid-1949, they generally 
hold 150,000 Arabs internally displaced within the newly formed State of Israel, as 
well as 600,000-700,000 refugees forced to places like the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt.49, 50   
Since that time, Israel-Palestine has been a place of almost-constant conflict. 
Land has been taken and lost. Intifadas (seasons of great unrest and fighting 
between Israeli forces and Palestinians) have characterized a suffocating society. 
Questions concerning the legitimacy of a “Jewish Democracy” and the reality of non-
Jewish minorities loom in political discourse (both national and international). The 
construction of a still-unfinished “security barrier” began in 2002 that would serve 
to “prevent terrorists from entering Israel from the West Bank,” but is also projected 
to swallow about 15 percent of the West Bank and even separate villages and 
farmers from their fields.51 The Gaza Strip, called “the world’s largest open-air 
prison” by Noam Chomsky, is plagued by toxic waste, poverty, lack of food, and poor 
                                                        
49Ibid., 281. 
50 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 1. 
51 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 845-825. 
   
20 
access to medical care.52 As well, there still remains an “ever unsolved question” 
according to Israeli scholar of law and politician Amnon Rubinstein, namely: “Will 
the new Hebrew nation, on regaining sovereignty in its land, forsake all claims to 
Jewish exclusivist tradition and become a nation like ever other nation?”53 Today, 
when considering the divisiveness that characterizes the Jewish State, I believe this 
question could be answered in the negative. 
There remains a strain of nationalistic thought that desires to maintain the 
integrity of Jewish culture and, by extension, racial purity. In December of 2015, 
Israel’s Education Ministry moved to ban a novel entitled Gader Haya (Borderlife), 
which “describes a love story between an Israeli woman and a Palestinian man” 
from high schools throughout the country. The cited reason, according to the 
Ministry: “(the need to maintain) the identity and heritage of students in each 
sector” undergirded by the belief that “intimate relations between Jews and non-
Jews threatens the separate identity.” Furthermore, they stated, “young people of 
adolescent age don’t have the systemic view that includes considerations involving 
maintaining the national-ethnic identity of the people and the significance of 
miscegenation.”54  This kind of ethnic separatism is promulgated by the “rabbinical 
establishment” in the State, which enforces “prohibitions and bans” on any marriage 
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that is interfaith, interracial, or same-sex.55 In short, the upholding of racial integrity 
falls high on the list of some key political and religious figures, and thereby fosters 
an environment that actively opposes romantic encounters across faiths and races. 
Furthermore, rhetoric revolving around fear permeates much of Israeli 
culture. Before the United Nations General Assembly in October of 2015, Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke concerning the nascent Iran Nuclear 
deal, saying, “The UN should finally rid itself of the obsessive bashing of Israel,” for 
“Israel is civilization’s front line in the battle against barbarism.”56 In short, the State 
of Israel is surrounded by hostile, evil, backward powers that seek one thing only: 
the eradication of the Jews and the destruction of “Western, democrat, and liberal 
ideals.” For Netanyahu, the potential enemies are not only outside of the State, but 
also within. The day before elections in March of 2015, he issued a video message on 
Facebook stating, “The right-wing government is in danger. Arab voters are going en 
masse to polls. Left-wing NGOs are bringing them on buses…with your help and 
with God’s help, we will form a nationalist government that will protect the State of 
Israel.” This message was given in response to the Joint (Arab) list posting that ten 
percent of Israeli Arabs had voted, up from three percent in the last elections.57 This 
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near-constant tension characterizes much Israeli political discourse, and propagates 
a culture of fear both of forces within and without the State of Israel. Protection 
becomes preeminent, and violence can (and historically has) become what some 
might call a “necessary evil.” 
The rise of radical religious Zionism has been epitomized by the settlement 
enterprise. Bernard Avishai, author of “The Tragedy of Zion,” has characterized 
these “new” Zionists as viewing Palestinians, “as a distraction on the landscape that 
will be eventually replaced.”58 These strains of nationalistic ideologies hold that the 
Biblical borders (which include the West Bank and Gaza) given to the Israelites still 
stand today, and therefore any person not of the “Children of Israel” must be 
removed. As a result, many settlers are given to radical religious fervor, and have 
been implicated in terrorist attacks. For example, settlers have been implicated in 
the burning of a Palestinian home that killed three of its five residents (one of whom 
was an 18 month-old) in the summer of 2015 and the subsequent wedding video 
that surfaced December 2015 showing Orthodox youths dancing with guns and 
knives while stabbing a picture of the same recently murdered toddler.59 In short, 
this ideology is one of no quarter, and is held by a sect of Israeli people whose 
population is growing rapidly. More chillingly, a recent Pew Research Forum study 
showed that, when Israel’s Jewish population was asked “whether they strongly 
agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that ‘Arabs should be 
expelled or transferred from Israel,’” forty-eight percent of Israeli Jews answered 
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with strong or simple agreement. Religious Jewish groups exhibited a higher desire 
for expulsion, yet even non-religious circles responded thirty-six percent in favor of 
removing Arabs from Israel.60 Therefore, these ideas of mistrust, fear, and even 
disdain of Arabs are rather common, and point to a deeply divided society over 
nationalistic, religious, and social lines.  
In conclusion, the State of Israel truly is a deeply divided, nuanced, and 
fearful conglomeration of people, ideas, ideologies, nationalism(s), trauma, violence, 
and uncertainty. This fear, uncertainty, and memories (and current realities) of 
trauma lead to “both sides (of the conflict)…delegitimizing or even dehumanizing 
their adversary,” thereby fostering division and sustaining violence.61 Rubenstein’s 
question of Zionism remains. What will its legacy be? Will the universal values once 
trumped by leading intellectuals characterize the Jewish State? Time will tell. 
However, nationalistic fervor, manifested in both secular and religious strains, now 
seems to rule the day. 
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Section 3. 
Emmanuel Levinas: Totality and Infinity 
War has colored human history.  Violence abounds in the pages of Holy 
Scriptures, ancient tales of heroism and treachery, and the headlines so 
breathtakingly efficient at heralding the latest tragedy. It deeply influenced 
Emmanuel Levinas, who spent years as a prisoner of war in Germany after capture 
in 1940.  This time, already trying enough, was further impacted by fact that he was 
a Jew. He opens his seminal work, Totality and Infinity, with the claim, “Everyone 
will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not 
duped by morality.”62 That is the question of morality affects everyone. Can we trust 
our systems of morality? Do they even exist? Or, are there certain assumptions that 
we as humans make that necessitate a “morality” which, in some way, accepts some 
dark realities of our history as “necessary?” 
 Levinas is extremely concerned with morality. He is also extremely 
concerned with war, both in the literal sense and in the more figurative sense of an 
ongoing state of violence in society. He writes, “Does not lucidity, the mind’s 
openness upon the true, consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of 
war?” The thoughtful, clear-minded person is, therefore, obligate to acknowledge 
that war and violence is pervasive. It is permanently possible, and furthermore “the 
state of war suspends morality; it divests the eternal institutions and obligations of 
their eternity and rescinds ad interim the unconditional imperatives.” The demands 
of war are all consuming, and take the power—the obligation—of morality and 
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rescind it. It is thrown to the side, sacrificed on the altar of, “the art of foreseeing 
war and winning it by every means,” which Levinas calls politics. He goes as far as to 
posit, “Politics is opposed to morality, as philosophy is to naiveté.” In short, he is 
strongly opposed to war, of politics, and the “very exercise of reason” that is 
employed to uphold these historical ideals that so violate the very nature of 
morality.63  
 War does not only concern the “powers that be,” such as governments, 
politics, and the like. The individual’s being is also affected deeply by its disruptive 
power: 
But violence does not consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as 
in interrupting their continuity, making them play roles in which they no 
longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but 
their own substance, making them carry out actions that will destroy every 
possibility for action64 
 
For Levinas, violence is a violation of what it means to be a being. Personhood is 
disturbed by its interrupting infringement, and individuals lose their ability to 
recognize their very selves in light of the moral suspension that is war. In fact, “Not 
only modern war but every war employs arms that turn against those that wield 
them.” The cause is irrelevant. These “weapons” are destructive to all, and they are 
by no means solely steel. They are wounds that penetrate deeply into the being, the 
fiber, of the individual and disturb the “continuity” of their very personhood.  
He then continues, “It (war) establishes an order from which no one can keep 
his distance; nothing henceforth is exterior. War does not manifest exteriority and 
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the other as other; it destroys the identity of the same.”65 It is radically inward 
looking. The other, the one with which you are fighting, is not you. You are you. They 
are “them,” and violence becomes the natural response to an encounter with said 
“other.”  
 How, however, does one arrive to an ideological stance that necessitates war 
with the “other?” According to Levinas, “The visage of being that shows itself in war 
is fixed in the concept of totality, which dominates Western philosophy.”66  This is a 
strong statement—localizing the reality and horrors of war solely on this “concept 
of totality” is sweeping, and perhaps too ambitious. What, therefore, is this totality? 
His key claim is, “The meaning of individuals (invisible outside of this totality) is 
derived from the totality. The unicity (oneness/unity) of each present is incessantly 
sacrificed to a future appealed to bring forth its objective meaning.”67 A totality 
swallows individuality. It defines the purpose and meaning of life. It demands 
sacrifice in order to maintain its integrity. People become pieces of a whole that are 
ultimately disposable for the sake of the totality. And, perhaps most important, 
individuals outside the totality are rendered “invisible.” Totalities erase persons 
who are not part of the in-group. They define what it means to be worthy of worth, 
and the rest are disposable.  
 Totalities define history. They bend it to fit the narrative that benefits the 
group. Furthermore, they are insidiously invisible, for, “Individuals are reduced to 
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being bearers of forces that command them unbeknown to themselves.”68 They are 
assumptions, “the way things are.” Totalities carry a sense of finality, that any 
argument levied against it is fundamentally flawed, or simply asking an 
unintelligible question. Empire is dependent on them, as “the peace of empires 
issued from war rests in war.” And, at least according to Levinas, these strains of 
thought, these totalities, “dominate Western philosophy.”69 John Wild writes of 
Levinas’ “totalizers” as those who, “seek power and control…strive for order and 
system…(and) many examples of the former (totality) can be found in the history of 
our Western thought.”70  
 Levinas’ response to such a totalistic viewpoint is rooted in the reality and 
significance of the human face. For him, the face is a unique center of identity and 
individuality, thereby rendering it the most revelatory part of a person.  What 
qualities could lead him to such a conclusion? First of all, it is important to notice 
that the five senses are all located at or near the face. The mouth contains the 
tongue, which tastes food that serves to bring people together. The ears pick up 
notes of music and the voices of friends and loved ones. The nose catches the 
wafting aromas of flowers in the spring. The face is sensitive to touch, and one of the 
deepest expressions of human affection, the kiss, is felt in the lips. And, the diversely 
colored eyes of individuals have become the theme of many a love song or poem, 
spawning lines like, “Turn your eyes away from me, for they overwhelm me…” in the 
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Old Testament and “I can see the mysteries of God behind your beautiful brown 
eyes” in modern folk music.71, 72 
Furthermore, research has shown that spontaneous human facial 
expressions of emotion (happiness, anger, and contempt) are universal and innate. 
They cross cultures and, surprisingly, are exactly the same in people born blind, who 
have no chance of acquiring them from others.73 The face is also strongly tied in 
with one’s individual identity. Masks are used to conceal one’s visage, and thereby 
one’s personhood. Alexandre Dumas’ The Vicomte of Bragelonne: Ten Years Later, 
and its story of the Man in the Iron Mask, tells of a gross violation of an heir’s right 
to the throne, where the means of subjugation and separation is forced masking. 
This revoking of the face violated the prince’s very humanity. In short, there is a 
kind of universality in the identity and work of the face that transcends race, 
religion, nationality, and culture.  
Therefore, Levinas’ answer to all-pervasive totalities is localized in “another 
concept, the concept of infinity…(which is) needed to express this transcendence 
with regard to totality, non-encompassable within a totality and as primordial as 
totality.”74 Furthermore, Levinas’ infinity is located in the human face, which is 
“present in its refusal to be contained…it cannot be comprehended, that is, 
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encompassed.”75 The human face is uncontainable. It cannot be bridled or subdued. 
In fact, since it is infinite, to experience the face is “to contain more than one’s 
capacity (which) is to shatter at every moment.” He acknowledges that this is a 
subjective approach, so the goal of his work is to therefore “present subjectivity as 
welcoming the Other, as hospitality; (for) in it the idea of infinity is consummated.”76  
 The answers to totality, for Levinas, are located in the infinite heart of the 
Other. He therefore rejects Plato’s famous maieutic method, where one is 
questioned until the answer, which lies within the self, is uncovered. He also rejects 
streams of thought (particularly religious ones) that seek to localize true meaning in 
a single place, person, or God. For, “To approach the Other in conversation is to 
welcome his expression…to receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I, 
which means exactly; to have the idea of infinity…Teaching is not reducible to 
maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me to more than I can contain.”77 
He introduces a kind of “pedagogy of the Other,” which is rooted in what he calls, 
“radical exteriority,” or openness to that which is different. This openness, in every 
way, undermines the all-encompassing nature of totality.   
 Levinas’ thought is irreducibly married to morality and ethics. And, not 
surprisingly, his ethic is rooted in the “facing position, opposition par excellence, 
(which) can be only as a moral summons. This movement proceeds from the other. 
The idea of infinity, the infinitely more contained in the less, is concretely produced 
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in a form of relation with the face.”78 The face, which, “resists possession, resists my 
powers,” opens a “new dimension” for the beholder, where “the face speaks to me 
and thereby invites me to a relation incommensurate with a power exercised, be it 
enjoyment or knowledge.”79, 80 Whereas the Other, for Levinas, is the “sole being I 
can wish to kill,” the “epiphany of the face” possesses the “ethical resistance” to such 
insidious goals.81 In fact, “the infinite paralyzes power by its infinite resistance to 
murder, which, firm and insurmountable, gleams in the face of the Other, in the total 
nudity of his defenseless eyes, in the nudity and absolute openness of the 
Transcendent.”82 The Other, localized in the authentic experience of the face, 
exercises a kind of power over the beholder. It is limiting, staying the hand of the 
murderer and calling the hand of the privileged to act in kindness and love. This 
limitation, however, is not suffocating. Rather: 
Thus in expression the being that imposes itself does not limit but promotes 
my freedom, by arousing my goodness…it is thus the irremissible weight of 
being that gives rise to my freedom. The ineluctable has no longer the 
inhumanity of the fateful, but the severe seriousness of goodness.83 
 
True, authentic encounter of the face of the Other therefore brings responsibility. It 
makes demands, and “imposes itself” on the beholder. Yet, this imposition, 
according to Levinas, ought to be welcomed above all, for in ethical response to the 
face is found true freedom. The Face is an enabler of good, if only it is seen.  
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 John Wild states, “as Levinas points out, one answer is given by the totalizers 
who are satisfied with themselves and with the systems they can organize around 
themselves as they already are.”84 The answer is to stay. To remain within the safe 
bounds of the totality, where the Other is invisible, and meaning is formed around 
the group identity. Wild then contrasts “totalizers” with “infinitizers,” who are 
“dissatisfied, and who strive for what is other than themselves.” They see that the 
totality by no means encompasses all reality, Instead, one must be willing to 
“transcend (thoughts and feelings)…(where) the individual person becomes free 
and responsible not by fitting into a system but rather by fighting against it and by 
acting on his own.”85  Levinas himself writes: 
Between a philosophy of transcendence that situates elsewhere the true life 
to which man, escaping from here, would gain access in the privileged 
moments of liturgical, mystical elevation, or in dying—and a philosophy of 
immanence in which we would truly come into possession of being when 
every “other” (cause for war), encompassed by the same, would vanish at the 
end of history—we propose to describe, within the unfolding of terrestrial 
existence…a relationship with the other that does not result in a divine or 
human totality, that is not a totalization of history but the idea of infinity. 
Such a relationship is metaphysics itself.86 
 
True life is, therefore, not to be found in a totality of human conception or divine 
exteriority, but in the “idea of infinity,” which is a metaphysical reality that shatters 
expectations, demands ethical responses, and undermines the sweeping totalities 
that so seek to render the Other invisible and irrelevant. This is an all-encompassing 
reality, one that crosses culture and spans borders, supersedes religion and 
undermines conflict.  
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 In conclusion, Levinas’ answer to totalities that inevitably lead to war is the 
human face. The authentic encounter. As a result, the greatest success of the 
totalizers would be to “limit the infinite,” that is, keep faces from ever meeting. No 
encounter, no shattering. The totality maintains its integrity, and the Other ceases to 
exist, thereby allowing violence, murder, and finally war.  The “epiphany of the face” 
is, therefore, of utmost importance. Life, infinity, and the realization of the 
“experience par excellence” that can be found only in the Other, hangs in the 
balance. 87 
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Section 4. 
Methodology 
In the fall and winter of 2015-2016, I conducted ethnographic field research in 
and among ethnic and religious minority communities in Istanbul, Turkey and Haifa, 
Israel.88 The goal of this project was to discover if (and if so, how) interpersonal 
interactions serve to reshape, undermine, or even shatter the conceptions people 
possess of the “other,” a relation that is often one “of power, of domination, (and) of 
varying degrees of a complex hegemony.”89 I chose to focus on the minority 
experience, for they are almost constantly made aware of their status, are in steady 
contact with people of the “majority culture,” and often-times are the voices least 
heard because of the dominating influences around them.  
 
I collected eighteen semi-structured interviews, each from about 45 minutes to 
an hour long, and agreed to strict privacy of each individual who participated.90 The 
key demographics were: 
 
 Seven interviews in Istanbul 
 Six Armenians (Four female, two male) 
 Teachers, Priest, and Doctor 
 One Kurdish male 
 Tour coordinator 
 Ten interviews in Haifa 
 All Israeli Arab citizens of the State of Israel (Seven female, three male) 
 Teachers, workers at local non-profit 
 Six were students at the University of Haifa 
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LOCATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHICS: 
 
Istanbul, Turkey: 
 
Istanbul is a bustling modern city of approximately 14 million people. It is 
rich in history, and is unique in its cultural mosaic. Most Armenians (40,000-
70,000), Greeks (2,000-3,000), and Jews (17,400) that remain in Turkey reside 
within its limits. I lived in an apartment in the neighborhood of Tarlabaşı, and made 
most of my contacts in the Armenian community through a priest I met during an 
academic trip with Wofford College in January 2015. I met other minorities, such as 
Kurds and Syrians, through contacts with local churches. In total, I spent a month in 
Istanbul in the fall of 2015. 
 
 
Haifa, Israel: 
 
Haifa is the third largest city in the State of Israel, and is the largest in the 
north. Within its limits, there are approximately 277,000 people. It is lauded as one 
of the few “mixed cities” in Israel, with an Arab minority making up about 10% of 
the total population, largely localized in the lower city (Haifa is built up Mt. Carmel) 
in neighborhoods like Wadi Nisnas, Halisa, and Abbas. During my time in Israel, I 
studied at the University of Haifa and interned at a local non-profit, and I met all my 
Arab interviewees through contacts established at these locations.  In total, I spent 
four months in the State of Israel and the Palestinian West Bank. 
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Section 5. 
Nationalism as Totality 
Istanbul:  
The air was thick with smog and sunlight, and the backpack I carried helped 
accentuate the growing dark spot on my back (of which I was painfully aware). This 
was one of my first interviews, arranged by the Armenian priest whom I had met a few 
days before, and the man with whom I was to speak, named Goryoun, works in the 
medical field. I had met him during my first visit to Istanbul when he spoke to our 
Wofford group about the state of minorities in modern-day Turkish politics. I was 
anticipating this meeting mightily—at that time, he had struck me before with his 
humorous, genial demeanor, and his serious knowledge of history and the state of the 
Armenian (and other) minority community. I knew I stood to learn much from him. 
I finally located the building after passing it a couple of times, and made my 
way off the bustling streets of Istanbul up a flight of stairs, praying that my sweat-
stained shirt would not be an immediate turnoff. After a few minutes of waiting in the 
(thankfully) air-conditioned office, I sat down with Goryoun and his curious assistant 
(some of these topics she was interested to explore for the first time as well) over 
Turkish tea in its famous hourglass-shaped glasses, and a lighthearted, yet soberly 
illuminatory, conversation began: 
I grew up in Istanbul, but my ancestors are from middle Anatolia. My parents 
could not speak Armenian, couldn’t go to an Armenian school. I believed that 
my grandparents couldn’t either, until one day I heard my grandmother speak 
our mother tongue. I was shocked, “why did you not teach my mother or me?” 
Her response, “We did not want your mother to have an accent.” It was a 
strategy to be in Turkey. Propaganda forbade the speaking of our language, 
and they chose to raise their children so that they would not be betrayed as 
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Armenian. Furthermore, when I was growing up, Armenian history was banned 
by the board of education. Things have changed, but slowly. 
 
He continued on to describe some divisive definitions and realities in the Republic of 
Turkey as it stands: 
 
Today, Christians and Muslims are identified on their identity cards. This is a 
way for discrimination, for the police can use that and oftentimes tie Christians 
in with the United States and anti-Turkish ideas. People think that to be an 
Armenian is not very good, and (Armenians) are therefore encouraged to 
change. To change yourself to “be Turk,” assimilated. There exists an idea of the 
“Ideal Turk,” which is made up of a special race, which is also Sunni (but weak) 
Islam. There is also a fake history, and people have begun to be aware (of it). 
However, recently fighting has broken out in the east again. Someone in the 
government said, “it is probably not a Kurd, but an Armenian,” (essentially 
saying) “Kurds could not do this, only the ‘bad society,’ which are Armenians, 
could do something like that. (It is an) Armenian trick.” It is shameful for the 
government to turn people (like this).91 
 
Haifa: 
Near the end of my semester at Haifa, I was close to exhaustion. Class work 
piled up, and last-minute interviews were at the forefront of my mind. My project had 
taken me from the Bosphorus to the Mediterranean, and my next interviewee, a 
teacher named Asma, had helped me process all the (many) nuances of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the weight that I felt wherever I went, and the fear and stigma-
laced rhetoric that colored political and media discourse. Her story was one that I had 
begun to piece together, but the opportunity to hear it in full was a prospect that both 
excited and humbled me. I settled into the now-familiar office, where pictures of the 
old city of Akka and other sights of what I had begun to call, “the Unholy Holy Land,” 
adorned the walls:  
(My Palestinian background) means to me that I was born to parents who 
came from Palestine, they were kicked out and my mother was able to go back 
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to Jerusalem until ’67, but after 1967 she wasn’t. They are both considered 
refugees, so that comes with a certain experience having grown up in a home 
that was very bitter about the situation. For instance, I grew up hearing about 
the big home my grandfather owned [in Palestine], which is still standing. I did 
not see a picture of it until I was older and somebody in the family found a 
great picture. Everyone in the family now has an enlarged picture of that home 
in their living room. 
 
I then steered the conversation towards Asma’s lived experience as an Arab Palestinian 
citizen of the State of Israel. That is, if it is hard to be who she is where she resides. She 
continued, without missing a beat: 
  
Of course it is hard (to be Palestinian in Israel). Just open the news. I don’t have 
to open the news; I have Haaretz [a local news outlet] popping up on my 
iPhone. The parent of the guy who did the shooting the other day (in Tel Aviv) 
was now arrested. And another person is I don’t know what…a soldier hurt in 
the West Bank. This is a very political place, and you can’t get away from being 
Palestinian. It’s very hard because it isn’t a place that is sympathetic at all. At 
all, if you ask me. Just open the news every morning and listen to it in Hebrew 
and how they speak. Very very very unsympathetic. So it’s very hard.92 
 
Nationalism as Totality: 
 
 In the previous sections I have shown how nationalistic ideologies color the 
prevailing attitudes and discourses of both Turkey and Israel. They permeate media, 
literature, and politics. They influence the thought processes of individuals. Even 
though the rhetoric and “ends” of the belief may be disparate, nationalism is, in 
many ways, assumed. This fact became apparent in the interviews I conducted. 
Furthermore, when I began to delve into Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity, I 
began to see similarities between his concept of totality and Turkish 
nationalism/Zionism. Therefore, in this section, I will argue that nationalism 
understood through the lens of “totality” can help elucidate the core concepts and 
ends of such ideologies, and perhaps begin to help lead us to an answer to the 
boundaries that so characterize human language and interaction. 
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 Totalities are, first and foremost, characterized by boundaries. Definitions of 
what it means to be “in” and “out” of the constructed identity. Nationalism 
(especially ethnic nationalism) is no different. As seen in the words of the Armenian 
doctor Goryoum, the “philosophy of the ‘Ideal Turk…(which) tried to create a new 
society with a faked ideal…(is localized around a) special race, and (weak) Sunni 
Islam.”93 Fadwa, a student at the University of Haifa, when asked to define what 
“Palestinian” meant to her, said, “It means I don’t belong to the flag of Israel. It is a 
Jewish state and I am not Jewish...I always have felt Palestinian, and never a part of 
the state of Israel.”94 The frustration at her exclusion from the national identity was 
felt in the forceful, urgent weight she gave her words. Another student, Nadir, when 
elucidating his antipathy towards making generalizations based on national and 
religious identities, stated, “(take) Jews, for example. Judaism is a religion and also a 
nationality.”95  
Emmanuel Levinas holds that a totality erases individuality in the pursuit of a 
unicity that maintains the integrity of the whole.96 This lens can cast a new light 
when one considers the ethnic definitions of “Turkishness” and Zionism. These 
constructed identities, often rooted in collective (sometimes fabricated) historical 
experience, serve to build a homogenous understanding of race and religion. I am by 
no means making the claim that every Turkish nationalist or Zionist aims to 
eliminate those outside the bounds of their ideology, but that these beliefs tend to 
lead to the results revealed by the recent Pew research in Israel which indicated a 
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forty-eight percent strong or simple agreement with the phrase, “Arabs should be 
expelled or transferred from Israel.”97 The nationalistic totality, when embraced, 
creates an environment where it is possible for individuals to be rendered “invisible 
outside of this totality.”98 
 In light of these constructed boundaries, the theme of fear, besetting danger, 
and enemies “within and without” the national borders kept resurfacing in these 
conversations. One interviewee, Karim, a worker at a local nonprofit in Haifa, 
remarked:  
The people’s mood in Israel is controlled by politics and the media. You can 
watch the news, it only speaks on one of two things: (1) The conflict, the 
internal Israeli-Palestinian conflict and (2) enemies outside, like Iran, Daesh 
(ISIS). All the “bad guys.”99 
 
He observed that this two-fold, yet remarkably singular focus served to shift the 
public conscience away from other problems like Israel’s shaky economic situation 
and drastic rises in what he called “non-democratic values,” instead rendering, “the 
only thing in focus is terror and more terror and more terror.”100 In Istanbul, a 
Turkish priest named Father Avedis remarked:  
Sometimes you feel bad because you notice that you are not accepted. You 
have that feeling sometimes…you will see that to use the name Armenian is 
to speak about “vital enemy,” whereas none of the Armenians are engaged in 
such kinds of problems. Because there are some problems and someone 
wants to find a solution by inflection, by seeing Armenians as the enemies of 
this country…101  
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In both locations, therefore, those who don’t fit the nationalistic totality become 
scapegoats when threats, whether real or perceived, arise. Furthermore, these real 
or perceived threats possess a unique power to unify, as observed by Karim, who 
said, “Americans felt more American when 9/11 happened…it (nationalism) was a 
unifying identity.”102  
As elucidated by Levinas, the “visage of being that shows itself in war” is 
rooted in the “concept of totality.”103 Conflict and fear create an atmosphere where 
one can never truly feel “safe.” Enemies are constantly surrounding you, your family, 
and your way of life, and “war” becomes the only response to this existential threat. 
The nationalistic voice becomes louder, calling the groups to unify in light of these 
threat(s), and those that happen to fall outside of that specific definition of ethnicity, 
race, and religious/historical origin become objects of fear that can’t be trusted. 
Another student, Nawal, reflected this reality in very straightforward terms when 
asked about the general perceptions Jews possess of Arabs according her 
experience, “Not trustworthy. Not at all. We don’t care how nice you can be, you will 
never fit in with us and we will never like you.”104 This distrust of those that don’t fit 
the definition of the nationalistic totality can result in violence, and even cause the 
totalizer to lash out against the wrong target, as observed by Nadir, “Many Jews 
think that all Arabs are out to get them. For instance with the incident…where they 
smashed a guy’s face because they thought he was Arab but he was not. He was a 
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Mizrahi Jew, of Iraqi or Moroccan background. Just looking like an Arab is dangerous 
here.”105 
These realities then lead to the beginning of an interesting discussion as to 
how the totality of nationalistic fear and fervor is created and maintained according 
to the lived experience of the minority community. One of the key examples that 
surfaced in the interviews at both locations was education. Khalil, another worker at 
the non-profit in Haifa, said of the education system in Israel:  
You see in Jewish schools that they always talk about Zionism, the Shoah, and 
so on. But, in the Arab schools you are not allowed to even talk about the 
Nakba, even though it happened to you and your relatives.106  
 
Therefore, the national curriculum is often oriented towards the collective history of 
the majority culture, even to the length of silencing the historical narrative related 
to twenty percent of the state’s population. I witnessed a poignant object lesson in 
this disparity of language and narrative when walking with friends through a park 
in the Hadar, a neighborhood halfway up Mount Carmel in Haifa. My eyes moved 
toward a low-set black monument, and I froze. The words I read: “Haifa Liberation 
1948” in English, Hebrew, and Arabic. This could not be farther from the 
“catastrophe” (Nakba) that was 1948 to the Palestinian people, and provides a kind 
of metaphor for the education system in the State of Israel as well. 
Concerning the state of education in Turkey, I heard from a Kurdish man 
named Seriyas: 
When you look at the Turkish education systems, it is an amazingly high 
nationalistic and racist curriculum that tells them that Greeks and Armenians 
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are the enemy…(in which they) teach the kids a one-sided false history to 
beware of those enemies that betrayed them107 
  
In fact, Başak İnce shows that Turkish civic education throughout its history, as 
recent as 1980 to 2010, “define(s) the nation as a union of language, religion, race, 
history, and culture, where the orthodox understanding of religion especially has 
begun to be counted among the basic characteristics of the nation. By doing this, 
hatred against non-Muslim citizens and people belonging to different sects of Islam 
is supported.” Furthermore, these textbooks are not characterized by critical 
thinking, and in all this “create a phobia of ‘the enemy’ in the minds of young people. 
Unlike in previous periods, however, the texts warn not only of external enemies but 
internal ones.”108 Goryoum pointed to this reality when he said: 
Recently fighting has broken out in the east again. Someone in the 
government said, “it is probably not a Kurd, but an Armenian,” (essentially 
saying) “Kurds could not do this, only the ‘bad society,’ which are Armenians, 
could do something like that. (It is an) Armenian trick.”109 
 
Therefore, this kind of education structure helps foster an environment where tiny 
minorities like Armenians are labeled as “traitors” by a public that has likely never 
met them.  
Once again, the notion of totality can help illustrate how these ideas form and 
flourish. John Wild writes, “It is this outwardly directed but self-centered totalistic 
thinking that organizes men and things into power systems, and gives us control 
over nature and other people.”110 The structure of education in both Turkey and 
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Israel reflect a nationalistic totality that is directed outwardly, that is, toward 
perceived threats and difference, and addresses then either in obfuscation, altered 
history, or even silence. This works to shape and orient the minds of youth toward 
the identity believed superior and necessary for survival. Language becomes an 
eraser or a sword, and power systems are put in place through words that maintain 
control over the “other.”  
While at the University of Haifa conducting research, my eyes were opened to 
an interesting reality. After a few months there, I had begun to learn the markers of 
Jews and Arabs (e.g. olive-drab uniforms for Jews and Palestinian Kuffiyehs for 
Arabs). During my walks to class, I started to observe that Jews and Arabs almost 
never grouped or associated with each other. One of the interviewees, Nawal, 
confirmed my suspicion.111 In more interviews, two possibilities struck me as 
“totality formers,” as it were, in these young people: military service and the Hebrew 
language.  
As mentioned in sections one and two, military plays a unique role in the 
formation and maintenance of the national identity in both states. However, my 
interviews revealed some interesting differences in the military’s influence on the 
minority experience in both locales. The Turkish/Armenian example I will save until 
the next section, and Israel-Palestine I will address here. When asked if she had any 
Jewish friends, Nadia, a student at the University, said:  
No…some I guess I learn with.  But, I don’t have any common ground with 
any Jewish students here. (Our relationships) don’t get very personal. Most 
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are older, usually twenty-three to twenty-four, because they serve in the 
military, take time off after their service (before entering university)…112 
  
Another student named Leila remarked, “(Jewish students) are so much older than 
us. They are twenty-five and older.”113  
Every Jew, both men and women, are obligated to serve in the military after 
high school graduation (thirty-two and twenty-four months, respectively).114 Arabs 
(except for Druze), however, serve only on a volunteer basis, and generally opt out 
of military service for to do so is generally viewed as a deep betrayal to their people 
and the Palestinian cause. Also, Arabs and Jews both often take a “gap year” before 
entering university, with Arabs generally arriving on campus at the age of nineteen 
and Jews twenty-one and up. Therefore, the life experiences of these students sitting 
together in classes and eating in the same lunchroom are drastically different. Every 
Jewish student spent the last two years or more serving in the military: going 
through physical training, drill, and possibly working in violent areas of conflict 
between settlers and Palestinians in the occupied West Bank. Different stories are 
shared. Inside jokes, shared military language, and, as Nadia said, similar 
experiences within Jewish circles lowers the amount of “common ground” students 
from these two groups share.115 This doesn’t even take into account the antipathy 
many Arabs feel towards the military as a result of the occupation of the West Bank, 
frequent confrontations with Gaza, and the like. Therefore, the expressly 
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nationalistic military requirement in the State of Israel not only serves to separate 
Jews and Arabs for a couple years of service, but also for years after in university 
and beyond.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in section two, in the late 19th century Eliezar 
Ben Yehuda championed and pioneered the Modern Hebrew language among the 
Jewish immigrants to Palestine, which is now the first language of every Jew in 
Israel.116 It is therefore a foundational facet of the Zionist movement and, by 
extension, the nationalistic totality of Israel. This is especially important in light of 
Israel’s Arab minority, whose first language is the Palestinian dialect of Arabic. After 
commenting on the problem of military service, Nadia said, “I also find it very 
difficult to express myself in Hebrew. It is hard to go deep. I don’t deliberately limit 
myself, but it just happens…I try and try, but there is a barrier.”117 It seems that her 
experience is that of frustrated communication. Another student, Nur, commented, 
“My relationship with the Jews in psychology class is not as strong because my 
Hebrew is not strong. When I start to speak, I start muttering.”118 When asked if she 
has Jewish friends, Leila answered: 
I don’t have Jewish friends, because my Hebrew is too bad. Sometimes I think 
that the Jewish people don’t interact with us because they feel there is a line 
between Arabs and Jews. I mean, they talk to you, and if they approach me 
and I am able to talk to them, then great. But, my Hebrew is bad. I’m really 
bad.”119  
 
In short, these three individuals found a readily made barrier to connection 
localized in the Hebrew language. I was astonished at some of the Arab friends I 
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made who, at the age of nineteen, were fluent in Arabic, Hebrew, and English. Yet, 
most Palestinians were not confident in Hebrew. Also, it is rare to find a Jew who 
speaks Arabic. Furthermore, in conversation with Arabs I found that Jews who 
speak Arabic are often distrusted, for it is perceived (and a general reality) that the 
only reason a Jew in Israel learns Arabic is because they served in military 
intelligence. Therefore, the Modern Hebrew language, forged in the lived heartbeat 
of Zionism, has not only served to bolster the nationalistic totality of the Jewish 
State, but also widens and deepens the gaps between members of the totality and 
the ever-increasingly “invisible” other. 120 
Nationalism as Totality: Conclusion 
 In conclusion, Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of totality sheds light on the lived 
experiences of ethnic and religious minorities in the Republic of Turkey and the 
State of Israel (specifically Armenians and Arabs, respectively). The secular and 
religious nationalisms that so dominate political discourse, educational curriculum, 
media headlines, historical narrative, and so many other aspects of identity 
formation deeply influence the daily lives of minorities.  They become the Other of 
the “totalizers…(those who) seek power and control…(and) strive for order and 
system” through the creation and maintenance of ideology where individuals that 
seek to fit the totality, “are reduced to being bearers of forces that command them 
unbeknown to themselves,” and those outside the totality ultimately “vanish at the 
end of history,” in respect to this singular, all-encompassing vision.121,122,123 We turn 
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now to Levinas’ answer to the problems and divisions created by the totality; the 
infinite, as found in the human face.  
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Section 6. 
 
The Face: Inbreakings of the Infinite 
  
Istanbul: 
Our conversation continued on for an hour, spurred on by his assistant’s 
intermittent inquiries and astounded reactions, and Goryoun’s own gregarious 
personality. Tea abounded, laughter colored our language, and other people were 
called into or just stopped by the office to offer their stories. We seemed to have 
created a kind of “identity bubble” where all were able to discuss and question freely 
the backgrounds of each person, and the boundaries that color the Turkish mindset. I 
asked a probing question concerning his experiences as an Armenian in daily life, and 
he began: 
I am a doctor and a teacher, I have no accent, and my name is easily confused 
with Turkish names. Therefore, I am generally not identified as Armenian right 
away. Furthermore, when I teach, I wear no cross that betrays my identity as 
an Armenian. Despite all this, when I interact with people, I do not hide who I 
am. When they learn, their first reaction is very interesting. 
 
He said, in a surprised voice for effect, “Oh, really?” Then, Goryoun moved his hands, 
placing one on top of the other, with a thick space of nothingness left between them 
and continued: 
These two words are worth a thick book of social meanings and explanations. 
They mean that, “you are a good man, or you are a skilled man…how could it 
be?” For, to be an Armenian is to be worse than an enemy, it is used as a 
swearing word, (equated with) traitors.124 
 
Haifa: 
As Asma’s past began to unfold before my eyes, I could feel myself empathizing 
with her story. As I sat there, soaking in the responses I was hearing to my questions 
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concerning personal identity, story, and struggle, I began to see just how deep one’s 
national and ethnic identity runs, and the power it possesses when instilled by family 
and solidified through experience. After my question concerning her interactions or 
friendships with Jews, something astounding unfolded before my eyes: 
Definitely, loads and loads. I am surrounded by Jewish friends and I live among 
Jewish people. But I can’t really talk about that unless really going further. 
Where I came from growing up in Libya and Egypt, there were no Jews. The 
Jews were only the enemy. They were only the Satan, horrible people who took 
our land and made us refugees….so I have been going through a really long 
process over the years. I have gone through a long process. 
 
She then carried me along the process that led her from Egypt, Libya, England, and 
America to the chair in which she currently sat, a Palestinian professor in a Hebrew 
university: 
I can remember being unable to see a Star of David without cringing. I can 
remember going the other way when I was eighteen walking outside a 
department store in London after seeing a Jewish family with a kippa and all 
that. Just turning the other direction because I didn’t want….I had a bodily 
reaction. Heart palpitating and such. I can’t even explain what was happening 
to me. It wasn’t hatred. I was just very upset. I can trace it back to 1986 when I 
was at Georgetown University for the summer and was in class with a student 
who was Israeli. Then the teacher asked us to write a paper about the Arab-
Israeli conflict together. It was my worst nightmare. I don’t know if I had 
interacted with Jews at that point. But definitely never an Israeli, a “worse Jew,” 
as some might say. Yet, if I had never met him and realized that he is a father 
and I am a mother, to see that you can have coffee together and sit together, to 
connect…I began to see that the human needs to meet. I think one of the worst 
things to do is to put up walls. Walls only make people wonder what is on the 
other side and make stories about them. You need to meet them. People need to 
meet. People are thirsty, they are curious. 
 
Finally, she allowed me to see how these years and experience had culminated to 
influence her day-to-day life in this deeply divisive place: 
(All of this) doesn’t mean that I don’t react when some right-winged, strongly 
Zionist statements are made. But, I can also see the human being behind 
them…I have to live here with people of different opinions and political stances 
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than me, so I have to keep working on expanding my heart to include all of 
them. It’s a daily challenge.125 
 
Inbreakings of the Infinite: 
What can offer an answer to the deep-seated realities of the nationalistic 
totalities that so color the Republic of Turkey and the State of Israel? They are 
pervasive, created and maintained through education, media, political discourse, 
language, military, rewritings of history, and more. In many ways, it seems like it 
would be easy to abandon hope, to resign to this reality that will, in the words of 
Levinas, render those outside of the totality as essentially invisible and thereby 
justify violence and oppression. However, in the midst of the totalities that were so 
present in the interviews I conducted, some “inbreakings of the face,” as it were, 
rose to the surface. In short, despite all of the barriers that exist in these societies to 
prevent meetings, those key encounters do occur. And, they not only occur, but 
sometimes carry a kind of “infinite” power, of the same kind that Levinas speaks 
when he writes, “The face is present in its refusal to be contained.”126 The 
“uncontainable” nature of the face is the precise way to break the all-containing 
nature of totality, and viewing the interpersonal encounter with this language helps 
conceptualize and humanize the lived experiences of the people I met. 
 As I mentioned in the last section, early on my interviews in Istanbul 
revealed an interesting relationship between the Armenian minority and military 
service. Although the military is a powerful proponent of the nationalistic totality in 
Turkey, minorities like Greeks, Jews, Kurds, and Armenians are obligated to serve in 
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the military after finishing high school at eighteen. This time therefore becomes one 
of the only ways many Turks encounter these tiny communities generally localized 
in major cities like Istanbul and Ankara. One young Armenian teacher, Aghavni, 
when asked about any positive changes she’s seen in Turks after meeting them, said:  
None personally, my friends are not people that I meet the first time. They 
already have Armenian friends and say, “I know you.” But my friends in the 
military have told me something about their time. They have always said 
(because the different people serving are from many places in Turkey), 
people [Turks] said, “Oh, you are Armenian? We didn’t know you are like us!” 
My friends and I think that this is because they came from families that 
talked bad about Armenians, or because in school history lessons generally 
show that Armenians are our [Turks’] enemy. But when they meet us, they 
say, “Oh, you are like us!”127  
 
Another teacher, Nazeli, recounted, “When my husband was doing his military 
service, he had this friend who didn’t know he was Armenian for a certain period of 
time. When he did find out, he said, ‘No way, you can’t be an Armenian.’”128 
Therefore, obligatory military service in the Republic of Turkey can actually enable 
the face-to-face meeting of identities that otherwise never meet. 
 Another unique characteristic of these encounters is the surprise that Turks 
exhibit, for they generally do not realize that the Armenian is different in any way, 
for, as in the words of Father Avedis, “It we sit next to each other, you will not be 
able to notice (be able to tell) who is Greek, who is Armenian, who is Jewish, who is 
Turkish…because we are all belonging to Anatolia.”129 That is, there are no easy 
physical differences with which one can distinguish “origins,” for each group has 
spent such a long time in the same land. I kept hearing the word “mixer” when locals 
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(Turks and otherwise) would refer to Istanbul’s diversity in particular. Father 
Avedis continued on to say (with proper artistic flair) that when people realize that 
he is Armenian, it is as if:  
(They) are looking at you as a person from space, you are a lion…those 
persons are looking at you as if you are a lion. Coming from space. “Really, 
you are Armenian? Are you serious?” Of course, I am a human being too.130 
 
Avedis gave the same emphasis to the acute moment of encounter and realization 
that Goryoun did. That is, the, “oh, really?” moment, and Goryoun’s assessment of 
this interaction as:  
These two words are worth a thick book of social meanings and explanations. 
They mean that, “you are a good man, or you are a skilled man…how could it 
be?” For, to be an Armenian is to be worse than an enemy, it is used as a 
swearing word, (equated with) traitors.131 
 
This can be elucidated by a few additional words about and from Levinas. 
 First of all, the fact that Levinas chooses to frame his answer to totalistic 
ideology as “infinity” is very important. For something to be infinite, it is 
inexhaustible. It is impossible to fully grasp or define, or to quantify qualitatively. It 
is subjective, for its unending nature can be experienced in any myriad of diverse 
ways based on the person experiencing it. Further, the infinite has a tendency to 
overwhelm and thereby break boundaries. This power is tied into the human face, 
the encounter, by Levinas, who writes, “The face resists possession, resists my 
powers. In its epiphany, in expression, the sensible, still graspable, turns into total 
resistance to the grasp. This mutation can occur only by the opening of a new 
                                                        
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid.  
   
53 
dimension.”132 This points to why surprise was exhibited by the Turks who learned 
that the face that stood before them at that moment belonged to an Armenian, one 
whom the totality they internalized had cast as untrustworthy and contemptible. 
This experience of the other showed that they had tasted the uncontainable, and 
their surprise reveals that the infinite had begun its work. 
 This is the reason for which I shared Asma’s story above. Even though the 
focus of this paper has been the dominant Zionist totality as exhibited in the State of 
Israel, her story reflects beautifully this “infinite experience” that the face can 
catalyze. As can be seen, she grew up in a totality that (for some key reasons) cast 
the Jewish people, especially Israelis, as “the Satan, horrible people that took our 
land and made us refugees.”133 The “other,” the Jewish people, were invisible to the 
totality. This was only accentuated by the reality that there were no Jews in the 
places she resided. The totality cast the only vision of them.  
This changed when she moved from the Middle East to London, where this 
encounter with the Jewish family at the department store spurred a kind of, “bodily 
reaction. (With my) heart palpitating and such.”134 The infinite, the face that had 
been rendered “invisible” confronted the totality. The totality reacted, fighting this 
infringement, the resistance “to possession, to my powers” Levinas attributes to the 
face working in full force, thereby resulting in a literal physical reaction. Then, when 
required to work with an Israeli in a class concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, what 
Asma described to be “my worst nightmare,” her first true interaction with the 
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other, the face came to pass. The infinite beckoned, and she began to see, “that he is 
a father and I am a mother, to see that you can have coffee together and sit together, 
to connect…” This, among other key encounters, led her to believe and truly live out 
this phrase, “the human needs to meet.”135 Or, in other words, two (or more) 
embodied, infinite faces must truly see the other as the infinite, that which shatters 
totalities and cultivates, “such a relationship (that) is metaphysics itself.”136 
Furthermore, she has oriented her life around a path of “compassionate listening,” 
where you learn to “explore your own responses” to a myriad of stories, beliefs, 
ideas, and the people behind them.137  
This pursuit led Asma to listen to the story of a young Israeli woman in her 
twenties at a Compassionate Listening conference whose role in the military was to:  
Pick up the pieces of bodies after a bus explosion…I find it hard to even talk 
about. At the end, when we give feedback to the people we listened to, I 
remember looking at her and saying that I am so sorry this has been her 
experience. That I had kids her age that are spending their time exploring the 
world, going out with friends…and I just couldn’t imagine her at such a 
tender age doing the kind of work she was doing. And she immediately 
teared up, and you could see that there was a connection made between her 
and me on a human level. I was somebody who got her suffering. For me, this 
was an eye-opener. When looking at somebody who was a soldier, it would 
be easy to say “big deal” or “serves you right” or whatever (for serving). “You 
want to steal somebody’s country…” I could have gone that route. “You will 
pay the price.” Or, you can really see the suffering.138 
 
Asma’s unique, hard-earned ability to “see the suffering” reflects a receptive heart 
and mind. Levinas writes, “It is therefore to receive from the Other beyond the 
capacity of the I, which means exactly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also 
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means: to be taught…it (this teaching) comes from the exterior and brings me to 
more than I can contain.”139 This path of learning, of radical listening, and 
willingness to expand reflects a capacious understanding of lived human experience, 
and points to the infinitude to which the totalizer (until exposed) is blind. 
One may recall that for Levinas the concept of infinity is fundamentally an 
ethic. One of my interviewees in Haifa named Khalil, a local director of a nonprofit, 
told a story about his father that illustrates this picture, this ethic: 
One of the first stories that my parents had to deal with was a Jewish 
homeless man. He basically would curse my father every time he passed by, 
because of him [Khalil’s father] being an Arab. Then my father succeeded in 
making contact with him, and his anger toward Arabs was not because he 
knew Arabs but because it is what he grew up with, that Arabs are our 
enemy…(and) he had lost so much from personal problems. Once he [Khalil’s 
father] started talking with him, getting in touch, the person opened himself 
and started talking about his struggles and how he needed treatment140 
 
Khalil’s father embodied Levinas’ words, “To manifest oneself as a face is to impose 
oneself above and beyond the manifested and purely phenomenological form...the 
very straightforwardness of the face to face, without the intermediary of any image, 
in one’s nudity, that is, in one’s destitution and hunger” which is “(a) being that 
imposes itself (that) does no limit but promotes my freedom, by arousing my 
goodness.”141 He saw the face of hunger, of destitution, and answered the ethical 
imposition that leads to freedom in goodness, and undermined the nationalistic 
totality that would relegate him and that homeless Jew to be enemies. After that, 
Khalil remarked, “He [the man] no longer cursed, was happy to get support and was 
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eventually placed into an elderly house. Yet, he continued to visit us here, so this 
was only the beginning.”142  
This same kind of ethnical responsibility was echoed by another “infinitizer” 
in Istanbul, Father Avedis, who remarked:  
My aim is, when I wake up every morning, to go to school to teach the 
students how to be a person, a person who is just, a person who in any case 
(even if he has enemies), loves, to be a person learning about the culture, 
about the identity, and using the culture and identity of his own, mixing to 
the culture of the community of the land where he lives.143  
 
The totality becomes lost in the desire to learn, delve into, integrate, and thrive 
within the cultures and values of the peoples that surround the individual. This 
“mixing” is not characterized by a loss of identity, but rather of growth in depth and 
width as the infinite begins to overflow one’s conception of reality.  
Nawal, a close friend of mine at the University, told me a story of protest, 
violence, tear gas, sound grenades, and horses that left scars on and in her. She 
shared this memory with suspense, pride, and sadness. I could tell that this reality of 
near constant conflict was beginning to weigh on her just as it is on so many others 
(both Jews and Arabs), a weight that is reflected in Khalil’s words, “it (the conflict) 
makes a daily struggle. Instead of investing more time in developing your situation, 
your children, your surroundings, you invest most of your powers in dealing with 
this conflict.”144 Yet, Nawal’s demeanor changed when I asked about her 
relationships with Jews. She told me, “I have two really good Jewish friends. We are 
very close. I met them when they were fourteen and fifteen. One is from Haifa, so 
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could have many interactions with Arabs when growing up, and the other is from a 
town that doesn’t have many (Arabs).”145 When they met, they were surprised to 
learn that she wasn’t Jewish after she broke this reality to them by stating, “stop 
occupying me,” in her self-described “super straightforward, hurtfully 
straightforward (manner where) I often use the conflict as a subject of humor.”146  
In spite of (or perhaps because of) these blunt mannerisms, they are friends 
to this day. This then led me to ask her what difference she sees in these two 
individuals, as opposed to the majority of Jews she interacts with. She answered: 
That is a difficult question. I think it’s them—their personalities. It wasn’t 
the context in which we met (at a conference), because I met other nice 
people there but I have kept in touch with these two. Both won’t serve in the 
army, which is a big deal...one is male and the other female. They’re doing 
something less than the army, not IDF but still serving the country.147 
  
I continued to press, asking Nawal if it could be their parents: 
No, no, their parents are very very…no it isn’t their parents. The girl, when 
she told her mom (that she wouldn’t serve), she said “if you don’t go, I will 
kick you out of the house.” The guy once invited me over but decided against 
it because his father is a policeman, and therefore wouldn’t like me that 
much. I don’t know…it’s a very interesting question. They’re both very very 
unique. They both have gone through hard things in their lives. To answer 
your question fully I would have to know everything in their life. Yet I have 
seen them growing and have grown with them for two, three, four years now. 
They’re just, they’re very nice. They’re very kind. They have gone through 
really hard things but love life. It sounds really cliché but they really love life 
and see all the goodness…they love the world and love life. I think when 
someone really understands the point of life and understands how much 
beauty is around us I don’t think he would get stuck on…I don’t like calling 
the conflict a little thing…but compared to the huge things around us it’s 
really a little thing. Come on. Love each other. Settle down. Khalas (Arabic for 
stop/enough), it’s been sixty years, let’s just stop and take a moment to 
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appreciate how really beautiful life is. I think my two friends really 
understand that148 
 
Her friends, these two infinitizers, were given to a kind of appreciation for beauty 
that totalizers, wrapped up in the radical inwardness that characterizes ethnic 
nationalism, don’t possess. It can only be experienced, an experience characterized 
by, “the expression of a desire…for that which exceeds me and my self-centered 
categories.”149 
Inbreakings of the Infinite: Conclusion 
 In conclusion, some lived experiences of ethnic and religious minorities in 
Turkey and Israel are characterized by key “inbreakings of the infinite” that serve to 
undermine and shatter the nationalistic totalities of both the majority and minority 
cultures. Of course, the prevailing political and social climate serves to limit these 
essential encounters through well-worn channels like the media, military, 
education, and even law. Yet, in spite of all the barriers, there exist places like the 
non-profit in Haifa where I met men like Karim and Khalil, the latter of which said of 
their work: 
It’s a place where, once you get in, you sense that it’s not about your 
background, but about the essence of your existence, being a human 
being...(thereby) being treated equally, being taken care of, respected, and 
loved. I think those things have a lot of effect on people. It makes it a unique 
place.150 
 
In a similar way, an Armenian teacher named Negdar mused near the end of our 
conversation: 
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Many of them [Turks], they say, they use the word Armenian as a swear 
word. When they meet someone [an Armenian], “Oh! You are a good person.” 
This is why they don’t have any relationship or contact with them until today. 
This is the reason, I think. It they are able to work together or live together, 
they will understand that they are the same: human beings. Just their names 
are different or they go to church or mosque or synagogue…it doesn’t matter. 
We are still people.151 
 
Therefore, at both locations, there existed infinitizers. Students, teachers, religious 
leaders, doctors, and non-profit workers who seek to meet, know, and lean into 
relationships with those that are different than them. In this process, they have 
cultivated more capacious minds and hearts that, given the choice, would choose the 
path of learning, understanding, and respect rather than of definitions, boundaries, 
and exclusivity that so characterize that of the nationalistic totality.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have argued that the historical roots and current 
manifestations of secular and religious nationalism in the Republic of Turkey and 
the State of Israel are well understood in light of Emmanuel Levinas’ concept of 
totality. Furthermore, as discovered through ethnographic research I collected 
concerning the lived experiences of ethnic and religious minorities in these nations, 
I have explained that the best response to these all-encompassing, exclusive 
worldviews is found in the reality of the human face, as conceptualized by Levinas in 
connection with his notion of infinity. I have shown this through exploring the 
historical roots and present-day manifestations of Turkish nationalism and Zionism, 
introducing Emmanuel Levinas’ thought, and analyzing ethnographic interviews 
collected among ethnic and religious minorities in both locations while utilizing 
Levinas’ philosophy as an illuminatory tool.  
 This is by no means an exhaustive attempt at reconciling difference. Human 
institutions and thought are notoriously adept at defining and dividing. They utilize 
religious belief, socioeconomic sequestering, racial prejudice and disdain, and, as I 
have pointed to in this paper, secular and religious nationalism to foster these 
boundaries. These boundaries are largely constructed. For example, the concept of 
race and ethnicity is unintelligible to science; they are modern conceptions that 
possess no grounding in empirical reality. In a similar way, people of varying 
national and religious identity all share common desires for safety, meaning, and 
belonging, yet find remarkable ways to view those outside said groups as somehow 
lacking such deep, basic yearnings.  
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I believe these boundaries have been conceived and constructed in the past 
and present when people of difference meet in new and unprecedented ways. A 
typical response to these meetings is fundamentalism, that is, erecting of religious, 
racial, and national walls (both figurative and literal) that protect assets and 
insulate the group, thereby lessening the outsider and justifying indifference or 
violence in the name of safety and unicity. This characterizes Levinas’ concept of 
totality, which gives us a language and framework from which to analyze these 
realities. This framework can be further applied to individual and systemic racism in 
America, radical religious ideologies throughout all faith traditions, and, I believe, all 
human ideologies of division.  
Yet, I also hope to have shown the infinite localized in the human face is an 
antidote, a possible answer to the constructed totalities that characterize human 
governments, politics, rhetoric, class systems, education, economic hierarchies, and 
institutions in Israel, Turkey, and elsewhere. It is a subjective reality, as subjective 
as the individual faces and stories that meet. Yet, perhaps the power of this theory, 
this ethic, is that it flows from subjectivity. For totalities are truly objective: they 
define the way people are to be arranged, how and who they are to meet, and who is 
truly to be valued in the midst of terrestrial (and sometimes divine) existence. 
Therefore, I posit that what may the best response to these totalities is not another 
more powerful or comprehensive totality, but instead “the idea of infinity,” the 
human face encountering the one outside its own totality, the Other, “a relationship 
(which) is metaphysics itself.”152 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Institutional Review 
Board 
 
June 8, 2015 
 
Phifer Nicholson 
Department of 
Religion Wofford 
College 
429 North Church 
Street Spartanburg, 
SC 29303 
 
Mr. Nicholson, 
 
Thank you for submitting your protocol for research involving human 
subjects to the Wofford College Institutional Review Board. Your amendment 
to your application entitled “Inter-Faith Friendships: Seeking Peace in 
Difference” has been assigned protocol number 2015-5-24-2. Your IRB 
protocol and consent form met the qualifications for expedited review. 
Katherine R. Mickley Steinmetz, PhD, Chair of the Wofford College 
Institutional Review Board completed the review of the protocol and consent 
form. 
 
On behalf of the IRB, I would like to let you know that you have met all 
of the requirements and are free to begin recruiting subjects. Please add the 
IRB protocol number to your consent form and use the number in all 
correspondence with the IRB regarding this protocol. 
 
If there are any changes to the protocol, please submit them to the 
board as soon as possible for our review.  The protocol is valid for 12 months. 
 
Thank you again for your submission. Good luck with your endeavors. 
Sincerely, 
 
Katherine R. Mickley Steinmetz, 
Ph.D. Chair, Wofford College IRB 
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APPENDIX B 
I utilized semi-structured ethnographic interviews that pertained to the individual’s 
ethnic/religious identity and personal relations with the majority culture. 
Questions: 
1. What is your religious/ethnic background? 
2. Where are you from? 
3. Where do you practice your religion? 
4. Is it easy to be you where you live/where you are from? 
5. What, if any, difficulties have you as a religious/ethnic minority? 
6. Do you have many friends outside of your community? If so, where have 
these relationships formed? 
7. Have you found that these friendships have changed how people of the 
majority view your religious/ethnic community? Vice versa? 
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